A Luncheon Talk [on EU-US relations] by Jens Otto Krag at the Council on Foreign Relations. New York, 28 March 1974 by Krag, Jens Otto
i ' 
, • '' f 
. ' 
1 
' . . ; 
.. 
\ 
( . 
j 
' ': 
! ' 
I ~ .,.. ~-
\ ' i 
\ 
I 
1 
I 
l 
A 
~ I· 
·1 
t 
l 
i ' ~ 
'I 
l 
~ 
j 
i ' 
'l 
I 
,j ', 
i 
I 
! 
I 
• 
: 
\ 
A Lu~chcon Talk by Jens Otto Krag at the Council 
on Foreign Relations, New York City 
28 March 1974 
An old Chinese saying goes "if the Gods 
will give a man a hard destiny they will let him 
live durin~ interesting times." To my mind I have 
lived in a;1 interesting time. I was born in 1914 
when the Cermans were carrying out the Schliefen-
plan and consequently nearly won the First World War. 
Si~ce then my life has been a challenge. 
The latc:s-::. challenge is. 1.iy present job. As Head 
of the falro:)cJ.n Community's Deleg;:i_ tion in the United 
States, I have already enjoyed since January some 
interestir-<; changes in the political scenery. 
Even though I hive been endeavoring to 
analyze t:·:c current European-American crisis, I find 
it difficu:'..t to say in what sphere or on what level 
it belongs. Certain events indicate that it is 
decrea§i11J while other events or inter1Jrctations 
" 
indicate ·:,;l;lt there still exist serious <lifficulties 
in U.S.-fa ... ropcan relations. 
. 
.. 
'II ' 
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by the co,itent of Pres.i Jent Nixon's 
Chicago S9ccch the crisis was indeed ~crious. 
Accordin:i :.o the Prcsidci1t, the United States will 
wi thdra.'..: .::c)Ops from Eurupe and perhaps aircraft, 
naval vcs.scl.s, tactical liUclear weapons, and so 
on if Europe is not prepared to have its political 
and econc:-.,.i...: affairs work linked with dcfensc. 
The Prcs.i._:~::1:: s::iid that'' the tirne of the one-way 
street" :'..s ever. He suggested that Euro 11cans had 
given sig~,s of hostility in their rcJations with 
the U.S . 
• .. :'.·.c President's speech had been taken 
at its f::-.:.::..: value it wouiJ have spelled a serious 
change i:: 1 .. ~-: conditions of the alliance for 
Wester~ E~rcpc. The Europeans would have had 
,. 
' 
to accc:n 1:i,c proposition that all US-Eu·copean 
proble:n.::: ::1:..is t be dealt with in unison - - and not 
handled .:..~ different times or in different frarne,\1orks. 
h' C a r C ~~ II' ;l ·;· 1.: What the r C (J C t i On O f 1v CS t C r Jl EU r Op C 
would be. Especially one European country -- but 
not only t::at country 
against s;.:ci: a linkage. 
would react vigorously 
:" i 
• 
\ 
·~·:>-: general acccj·,tance of par,1ll•]lism or 
1 ink age i .s :-:. o t po s s i b 1 e r or Europe . l ll i s is t rue 1 n 
spite oC ·c.::c acknowledged nec<l for US-European solidarity 
to g u a L1 ;: ~ c L I\' e s t e r n E u r: i p e I s fr e c cl o m . 
It is rcaJily re,:ognize<l that c.llfferences of 
opinion on economic and c ommcrcial probl1~ms exist 
without: ~:~2s,:: affecting the fundamental iiasis of 
the Eurc>-.:~,,.-American alLi.:rncc. Nor can one deny the 
}Jractic:.....~ :~~r .. k bctl·!ecn pul.itical/economic and military/ 
security }~1-0:Jlems. But ::o put them ill one hat ,~ould 
create :.:;.;~~::. J.ifficul ties for the EconoJilic Community 
and wou:~. :or all practical purposes, be impossible. 
'.'; 1 :.: l1 re s l d en t s a i <l fur the r in h i s C h i c a g o s p e e c h 
that t:1-: (..i,:.;:; "for a onc-\,:ay street i~; o·.rcr. 11 
Ar1:er1cc.t:s could understand this only ,is .neaning that 
the U.S., ..... ::.i;:ost single-handedly, carries the burden 
of Eurc1:...::c~::. defense. Nothing could be loss true. 
The tru-::1 ::.s -::hat Europe,.111 military budglHS never before 
in peace ·.:. :.::1c have been so large. \fostcrn Europe 
provides ~::.out 75 per ce;lt of NATO's ground troops, 
80 per -:1.::.·.:. of the navy, ancl 75 per cent of the -air 
force. ·:\:.c.: ·11:estern European defensc budget has risen 
more th:d1 :~u per cent ovc:r the L:i.st tl1rc<: years. 
. e 
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Europe .:.s :,:.,: 11 frecloacling 11 in the common dcfense. They 
pro v i de :c.. s ._, o s t ant i a 1 an t: in c re Q s in g ( on t rib u t ion . 
Of cours~. icst0rn Europe, even with jts own strong 
defensc c:~J:t, cannot alone guarantee its own 
security. '.·.'astern Europe's security,as the French 
Foreigr. '..'.1.:1istcr pointed out in his answer to the; 
Preside~t's Chicago speech, stands on t~o legs 
one Eu:·c::-. ~'-~, tl:e other ;\meric::ir... The bas is for 
th0 l\les::~·-~·:: Luropc::in dc:L·nse structure is cooperation 
with th~ L~~ Qntl Canada, and reliance up0n the 
atomic u,:,t:-2lla. 
= ~:: ;J. rte J by say I n g that the r c a re 
c e rtai:1 s <'.:-.s of a bet t c ring in J\mc rican -1.:u ro pc an 
r(;latic· . .:... I refer to ti,c llouston televi.sion 
in t e r Vi C ,\· :: "s t Tu C: s Jay i i1 w hi C h the p 1" e s i. cl C n t g a V C a 
somewhat ~:::..fferent opinion and clearly saicl that 
withdra .. ::l c£ American troops from Western Europe, 
except ~~:; ~- ~)art of an a;.;recmcnt \vi th the Soviet Union 
about :fo,:.::.:.s..: reductions, \:as by no means i1is policy. The 
statcmcr.:: '-:cfusctl the most serious pa1 t of his Chicago 
speech. 
. , . 
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'.•iorcl "hostili.ty" used by the Presi<lcnt 
and al s 0 c y ;, l r . K is s in g c r in con n cc t i o n Hi t h e con o mi c 
po 1 i tica:.. -.:.8c is ion in the Common >larkc t C:ounci 1 
refers ·,:,:.:c;..::Hedly to the decision by the Community 
to undc::c:-.'.,:c J.irect ncgo,iations with 20 Mid-East 
countries ;):·imarily conc..: .. rning oil and European-
Arab coo~(;~~tion in this connection. As I understand, 
it \vas ::ot t1':.e substance of the decisjon which 
evoked Si..,·~:, ;:.-;tron.g American reaction. ( iiu rope, 
oi cours0, cl.:;pcn<ls on imported oil to a much higher 
degree :::1:L: :his country and it thus sccl!ls reasonable 
that 1,fr:s t-..: ~- :-. Eu 1·opc as a11 inclcpenJcn t cconomi c unit 
should i~:.~1.':1onc.lently neg,Jtiate for oil w i.th oil-
pre Juci:-:. ~; :\·t ~to countries . ) Th c iadi g:la t i_ on of 
the Ame:::i...:~;: A<l1,tinistrati.on was aroused because it 
bclievc<.l it: had not been fully consulted before 
the dccisio~ was made. 
- ·, .:\mcrican side has admitted that they 
had cer:~:~ fore-knowledge of it, an<l it seems that 
some cons i...::.. t:.ctions had taken place. But apparently 
they \\'er:.: 1:0::., in the American view, ~uf ficient. 
' 
The U.S . .'.;;'..,.i.nistration ;ilso fears th,tt ::urope m:.iy 
negoti::..tc -;1"c:h the Arabs at cross purposes with >lr. 
Kissinge::::':; plans and thus weaken his negotiating 
positio;: ::..;. attempting to bring peace in the Middle East. 
t 
, 
1 
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,_ 
6 
I t w o u 1 cl i :1e; c c J b e wrong i f E u r op e , 11 i ;.rn y way , 
hampcrc( -~:·.-.: American ne1:otiations. \':c arc as 
intcrcstc< :,s the U.S. G,)vernmcnt in scc .. ng a <lurablc 
p C a C e C :: : G f ,:::.:: i n the Mi <l d ~ e Las t an c.l. i Ii h a Vi n g 
Ara1.) oi::. .:..-:; 01,: into Europe close to the n 1Hmal level 
and at~~ ~G~ prices as possible. 
::0-.·:i..;ve r the <lcci s ion macle by the Europe an 
Co u n c i l 0 ~-- :·. ! i n i s t c r s ha s no o f l i c i al ~ t a ~us . I t . 
,.,, as t a:.;. I_;:: :..;. : a t i m c h' h c n Gr e at B r i ta in was a b out 
to chan::,:,_; ;,ovcrnments and the new Bri tislt govern:nent 
has no-c y-.:'(, accepted the decision. Therefore 
no steps '.:~.\'(.; been taken which could hamper 
~fr. Kiss.~;:~-.:~·'s ncgotiati.ng efforts. Thus, there 
is no ::::.c: ;_,_:: 11 !1ostility" and the "crisis'' in this 
rcs pee t c ~:. ':, c rcg:ndecl ;1 s non ex is tan t. 
:.::c.:,::.cnting pcrsoilally, I wish to add that 
t ho ugh ~ i: i.; e: l t ha t t h c E 1, rope ,rn count r i c s arc w i t h in 
their L:2..'.. t·igllts in seeking to negotiate with the 
Ar a b s , i t : : . :.: ..;; t non c t h e 1 e s s b e clone w i t h .s u £ f i c i en t 
cons i d 0 r "; t ~ c :·. for >l r . K i s s i n g e r ' s po 1 j t i c a 1 neg o t i at i o 11 s 
in the i11i.:..-.:1c Last and for the necessary follO\v-up 
s tcps "..:(_: L.~· \'/ashington J;nergy Conf crcncc. The f olloh'-
up is u:,~:.:::: '.·:ay and 1vill lca<.l eventual Ly to negotiations 
between ~::....: ,:rnin oi 1- consuming count rj cs and oi 1-
produci~~ ~:untrics. T11ls consideration is necessary 
for Europ,; .::o give 1n response to the American o ££ er 
t 
t'· 
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Th.:: :orcgoing 1s ·,vllat I ha<l occasion to say 
to The S..::._:::1,;t.ary of State last \rnek <luring a 
Con f c r c :: .: (: .i. Ji. h' as h i n g t on . He exp r e s s c cl s at i s fa c t i on 
w i t h t h i :: ; ( : 'c. i tu d c and s , 1 i cl i t was w r o n g to s peak 
o £ "hos::._ i. :y" v:hcn one ·.\ as speaking of Lu rope as a 
whole. :: was, he said, a single European country 
whose s:s:.:cne:nts and acts were regarded as hostile 
to the J. ~:. 
\·.·j_~~:-::. rcsr>cct to this part of the <lcvclo1)r.1cnt, 
I belic'.rc :1:c crisis has lessened. Other elenients, 
hm\'cvc:::, s c..:: .. , to indicate a certain 11,t r<l8ning of 
.. 
' 
attitud.c.;. '.\'c kno1v that two American government 
officiD.l:; > ;,'.;.;ssrs. lbrtm;1nn ancl .Sonnenfclt, should have 
visitcJ -:::~·,::-::-;cls to finish the LC-US declaration 
o i j o i ;: -.: ~:.·c.·..: r c s t s on t h ~: b as is of t h c 1 as t draft 
pre:sent,..::J t·y the Europeans. Their visit was cancelled 
as a rcc:c.:iv:1 to the EuropcJ.n Council of 01inistcrs 
dccisioi: -:.:c :·;cgotiate wi ~h the Arab countries. Further, 
Preside~-:: \ixon's visit Lo Europe for the 25th 
Jubilee OJ: ·c.li.e NATO decl:i.ration was c,1nccllcd. 
. ~ 
.. 
. . 
,. 0 
u 
T:-1 ... ,::;e: two events ~ire of course unpleasant 
signs io~ ~cstern Europe. ~t is not a very good 
omen for the alliance h'h(·n the President of the 
United s:~~cs can visit the Soviet Union but not 
visit 1·.'e:stc~·L Curope :it the same time or ;i couple 
of month~ t~~ore to m:irk the Atlantic tre;ity's 
2 S th bi :::·U . .:.'.~1y. According to my inf orrna t ion the 
initiative ~o resume talks on the content of the 
US-ComJ:1~:::~ :y dccla rat ion should come from the 
E u r o p c a :: .::: . It is the present American view that 
the curr~~: ~uropcan draft is unacceptable. 
1.:: t.:·::..; U.S.-Commui,ity Dec1arat·1on is still 
import:..:r:.c ~'-' the AmcriGrns and if they hish to have 
it rea~y :~r a Presidential visit at the end of 
April, tL..:,:: the ini tia ti vc for resuming Jrafting 
negotiatia~s must come from this side of the ocean. 
• • : ::; 
1
.l l <l 1 i k e to po in t t o a s u g .l', c s t i on made 
recently \y German Foreign Minister Scheel as a 
way out e,~: t:1c dilemma. He suggested tb:1t the 
Europe:.:..:'. ::olitical comritittee which collsists of 
the to1: :~,-~i.tical civil :;ervants from tLc nine 
member .::~:L::·::.rics could Sl:rvc as the b1iJy 
f o r t h e: l. u r 0 ;i c :.111 s i d e o r t h e n c g o t i a t i o n . 
.. 
' 
. . 
I 
t ' . ''. ,, ,' 
'. 
0£ cours ... · ::;1c problem he re is whether this 1s acceptable 
to all t::;.:; ,~inc countries and the US. One shoulJ ' 
not co:..::1-~ 0:1 the creation of a ten-country 
co1:uni tt-:.:: :::-:<.:rein the US would have the 
same ri,;:·.: e,:;: veto as a representative of the ~ine. 
A s o 1 u t .i c.-1 c an , w i t h goo d w i 11 , b e f o u n d . For 
instance -::1:.: Committee oC the Nine co11lc.l meet, 
reach :lcccl·c: among them~;elves, recess, and then have 
:rn in:::,J-:.·;.'.~.l :11ccting witL the American representatives 
in \\'hie:·,:::. spokesman for the Nine giv,:s the EC 
views 0;:.,: \cars Americall reactions ano \'icws. 
Then th~ \inc could rett1rn to their own committee 
c i r cl e t: e, :, .:: ck a f i n a 1 cl e c i s i on . If such a consul-
tative :,:·c-·,>.::durc could b1...: adopted it hould undoubtedly 
be of gr~~t help. 
It~~ hard for me to comprehend just why 
an expr1..::o:)1.on of US-European partnership should 
footin.;. 
1n that 
I refer to partnership on equal 
; am in a complete accord with Mr. Kissinger 
-.:,1 not believe the U.S. has any intention 
to do~i~~:~ [urope. If this were the cuse, the 
U . S . \-.' u :..: l ._~ : : :.i. v e a t t ache cl po 1 i t i c a 1 s t r in g s to 
.M:.irshaJ1. ~- :,: OT sought ~1 quid pro quo Ju ring tl:c 
period 01: ,;Le US atomic 1i1onopoly. But there w:.is not 
the sli,:(1-:.::cst attempt at American domin~1tion. 
.. 
LO 
Yet this ;:.:,r-c:1 of J\merican dominance must still 
be peric:~cally refuted. On bbth sides we must 
improve ~~r cooperation -- necessary [or the security 
of West-.::- .. i:uropc and, in the long run, indispensable 
for tht.: t.J. S. in affording it the neccs.sa ry strength 
in de<i::.L: ·,.fi th the Sovj (,t Union and China. A 
Western ELrooc no longer allied with the U.S. 
and one ,,:::::.;::h ha<l its 01\·n agreements \1'ith the Soviet 
Union i,,J::L~ :-:ot only we:.1;,cn itself but :.ilso 
weaken ·.::-:.:: lb i tc<l States in its attempt to f oi· gc 
a bala:i~:-.;(.. ~::1J durable horld peace. To my mind, 
the go""-:_::,/ o'..ir common western policy is now 
pc::i.ce . . • - . ·1 1:) ,. L L ::: 1 CU t t 0 acJ.icvc an<l hard to keep. 
'L>.: ~:anger for both EuroDc and the Uni tcd 
St at e s i. :; :: o ·c US do mi n at i on : i t i s o C a 11 i s o L1 t c d 
U.S. a~J ~ European policy which <lacs not recognize 
t h c n cc..:::; s -~ t y of At 1 anti~: so 1 id a r it y . S tl c h a 
[ U 1' 0 p Ca;, ] ; C ~ i. C y \•/ 0 U l <l S t re n g the I1 i SO l; I t i 'J l1 i S t i C 
forces i:·: ·.:::is country an<l threaten tl1c foundation 
of a poli-..:/ 1::hich has maintained the peace and 
. . 
.. 
.. 
\ 
il 
It is necessary to sock :solutions that will upgrade 
Atla11t·i _: 7. ,. 
frustr;i-~c.:-.:i Jnitcd States on one side of the Atlantic 
and an :~ s .:.; ::.. a".; c d l'J c s t c r n Lu rope on t h c o t he r s i <le 
open to S6vict pressure -- which eventually will 
lead t0 :1 i::u-ropean 11 FinL1ndisation." 
~~ ,\·culd furtl1cr 1 :i.l(e to 1nentio11 a fe,v 
economic ;;·:..·c:olems between Western Europe and the 
U.S. 1~ is not disputed that the Unjtcd States, 
accordin; to CATT, has a right to concessions due 
to the e~l~~gcment of the Community. There are some 
disagrcc~~~ts between responsible American officials 
ancl spo:c1.:s::;e;;-1 for the Co1:1munity as to the size of 
the cor:c ;.:;:: .:; ~ ons . Seen in the broader context thcs c 
disagrc(;j:,\.;:1ts arc minor and can be so1vctl through 
rcas on~:) l.:.: ncgoti a ti ons. 
h::cr1 evaluating military burden-sharing and these 
economic cos~crcial negotiations, one has to bear 
in mind c:1:a: the situation now is quite Jifferent 
from the ~)~:d,groun<l of Mr. Kissinger' s :; peech on the 
2 3 r d o 1 .\: : · i l L1 s t ye ::i. r - - hi s II Ye a r o f Europe II t ::i. 1 k . 
. ' 
.. 
. 
• 
'• 
' . ~ 
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At that t i L'. o the United States ha cl a h c c1 vy cl c f i c it 
1n its t)~::."l~tnce of payments, _the dollar was weak, and 
Congress ~JS against milLtary expenditure for troops 
in Western Lurope and pressed for harJ economic 
bargaining. The scene has changed. 1973 showed 
£ o r t h c f i :· s t t i me in l 4 ye a r s a s u r p 1 u s on the 
balance of payments. The balance of payments surplus 
Has a bi-:.: le:::;s in the fourth quarter c1nd it seems 
doubtful ·.:>...;ther 1974 wi 11 show a surplus or not, but 
a stron~ i·c.:overy of the US economy. and the dollar 
has taker, 1)lace in spite of the latest s11wll dips. 
I am a\.":..:.-c.· t11at the U.S., for the moment, has a 
weak OT i... (. CJ ; • c, ::l i C J e V C 1 0 pm C n t . \l!h e the r t h i s i s 
tcmpor~r:: cL' not is probably too early to say. But 
as far ;,.:s 1 can judge,tha economy of this country is, 
1 n spit c o ,. in f 1 at ion , 1 n g 6 o d shape and the 
economic circumstances or last year arc no longer 
a factor 1~ the debate. 
If: may return to security poiicy and to the 
cxpross:i.c:-. :•one way strcct 11 I would L kc to end with 
·, 
r cm arks 1·. ; ; i -: ii I s ;..i y as ;J JJ an e , 11 o t as ;J i- c p r c s c n tat iv r.· 
for ths:, :.:: :1;.d aJso as u fonncr mc1nber of changi111:.; 
Dani s h 1 '. (; '.' ~: c i ·, ill c n t s t h r o u !'. h the y c a r s . l know very 
well tl1~t ~crtain Europc~n countries can be criticizcd:-
among tl1osc Denmark-- for spending a smaller percentage 
of their C:.\P for dcfensc than for ins t.ance the United States. 
.. ,.•• 
( 
I 
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But still tl:e expression 11 onc way strcct 11 is 
wrong. l ~.::: thinking of the important bas cs of the 
U.S. in ::,:::.: ~orthcrn par c of Europe. On Greenland 
there is ·::.:h: Thule base 1·:hich had and still has 
great st~i:cgic value. ln Iceland there is the 
Keflavi~ 2ujc which to my mind is important. During 
a visit :0 rhc Faroe Islands I saw the NATO Base 
there 1.1;·.~-=n although small is an indispensable 
link in t::c.: chain of our common stratl~gic defense.The 
Danish ~cl~~se system, for the time being, is 
undergoin~ change with a view to creating a system 
which~~:~ co particularly adapted for Danish 
needs ci;-;,: ::ut merely a n,iniature of tl1e :-;ystem of a 
1 ~ Y g C C () ~.:.: ~· -~· )' • 
\·;" ::~l.Ve a common defense syste1n in the Baltic 
Sea wit!":. c,~her NATO allies. We have ·in Karup 1n 
Jutland~ very important military airport with· 
top NATG c~~ability in war time and finally we have 
a close :ca)cration with other NATO land forces in 
the Southern part of Jutland especially 
with tL.: t·.c:nian clefensc of Schleswig-llolstein. None 
' 
o f the :; e: :.: : · ,- ~mg e :i, c n t s s h O\v d c f e at i s m o r l. a ck o f co op er at ion . 
r . • 
' • . 
. ' . 
... 
I 
l '. 
I 
j 1i 
I think " .. :.,._:; United Statcc.: should evalt1atc the .European 
defense: e.:,:~:ort more reaJistically. 
,:· . .'.', z.:vJ. l ua ti on of the ·conditions of the European 
s i de o f t l--.;: r\ t 1 ant i c s ho u l d in c 1 u de t h 0 fact that 
British :..:i::>O:t Government through statements by 
Forcig;-i >L::-1.i.stcr James Clllaghan has given some 
very re2::.:i.~;tic vieh'S. When the new Wilson Government 
to o k o v,.:; :..· v L c co u 1 d b c j n do u b t as to w h at was me ant 
by the c.:-::·,r.:;ssio~1 "renegotiation" to 11hich he 
poli ti.::c,:ly 1:ad tied himself. After ,·ea Jing Mr. 
CallagL ·.rr. 1 s s ta tcmen t it seems unlikely that the 
British -::~,vcrnment wishes a deep and thorough 
re-negot:~.·,:ion of the Roll\C Treaty. Such an exercise 
~oultl t~ke.: ~0veral years and would involve the 
govorrnr:e;:1-..::; ~nd parliaraents of all the nine countries, 
and it ~c~l~ be followed by scores of problems 
I 
from otr,,._:; .. - JOVernments hhich may not have anything 
to <lo ·,\· i t >. :: h c British i n t ere s t s in r c n c got i at ion . 
It woull_; ,_::.:~gcrously weaken the Community, which 
s t i 11 Ji ::l s ~l l on g way to g O b e f O r c i t h e C O mes the 
Co:nmuni -.:y i..::nvisagecl by the Rome Treaty. Accoruing 
to Mr . C 2 ~ >, .;; ha n , Great B r i t a in \\.ants a r c neg o t i a t i on 
on spcc.l_;::ll: arc:.:s wi:hin the Rome Trc:.1ty-- £0 .. :i: 
